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Casenote
The Great Escape: How One
Plaintiffs Sidestep of a Mandatory
Arbitration Clause Was Applied to
a Class in Bickerstaff v.
SunTrust BankI. INTRODUCTION

For decades, class action lawsuits have played an integral role in the
American legal system because of their ability to combine a large number
of small claims into an action large enough to garner the attention of both
defendants and courts.' While class actions have undoubtedly provided a
crucial service to many Americans, several key questions have persisted
regarding the authority of the named party or class representative. Specifically, courts have struggled to define the named party's ability to assemble the class and launch the action. In both the federal courts and the

* I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Professor Patrick Longan for his immensely helpful advice. This Casenote benefited greatly from his input. I would also like to
thank Shannon, Mom, Dad, and Ethan for their constant support.
1. For a general discussion of class actions in Georgia, including policy concerns and
practical application, see Jeffrey G. Casurella & John R. Bevis, Class Action Law in Georgia: Emerging Trends in Litigation, Certification, and Settlement, 49 MERCER L. REV. 39
(1997) (arguing that class actions can fill a vacuum created when courts and legislatures
fail to pursue causes of action that adversely affect certain segments of society). See also
MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM

OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 1, 21 (2009) (arguing that class actions can have potentially
massive benefits to society, though they can also be used as engines of chaos in the legal
system).
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courts of Georgia, a trend towards giving more power to the named plaintiff has emerged. In Bickerstaff v. Sun Trust Bank, 2 the Georgia Supreme
Court was given an opportunity to continue this trend, and it did just
that.
In Bickerstaff, the court was presented with a case of first impression
as it dealt with the question of whether a party who files suit and attempts to certify a class may satisfy a contractual limitation period for
"opting out" of a mandatory arbitration clause on behalf of absent class
members. The court answered with a resounding "yes," and in doing so,
it greatly increased the power the named representative to a class action
possesses. This trend will have lasting effects, even in spite of the Supreme Court of the United States' arbitration-friendly ruling in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,3 where the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act4 preempts many state law challenges to arbitration clauses.
The importance of Bickerstaff is further evidenced by SunTrust Bank's
(SunTrust) unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

SunTrust included a mandatory arbitration agreement in every contract it entered into with depositors. 5 In 2010, these arbitration agreements were deemed unconscionable by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida.6 As a result of this judgment, SunTrust elected to amend its mandatory arbitration clause. 7 The new contract allowed depositors to opt out of the mandatory arbitration agreement if they sent SunTrust a written notification which expressed that
desire within a certain window of time.8
However, just before SunTrust altered the terms of its contract, Mr.
Jeff Bickerstaff, Jr. (Bickerstaff), a SunTrust customer and depositor,
2. 299 Ga. 459, 788 S.E.2d 787 (2016).
3. 563 U.S. 352 (2011).
4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012).
5. Bickerstaff, 299 Ga. at 459, 788 S.E.2d at 789.
6. See In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 734 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1292 (S.D. Fla.
2010). However, as the court in Bickerstaff points out, this case was subsequently overturned in In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, MDL No. 2036, 459 F. App'x 855,
857 (11th Cir. 2012), and in the landmark case, AT&T, 563 U.S. at 352, the Supreme Court
of the United States held that a class action waiver in a contract arbitration clause is enforceable, and any state law ruling that such a clause is unconscionable is preempted by
the Federal Arbitration Act. See Bickerstaff, 299 Ga. at 460, 788 S.E.2d at 789 n.2.
7. Bickerstaff, 299 Ga. at 459-60, 788 S.E.2d at 789.
8. Id. at 460, 788 S.E.2d at 789.
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filed a complaint against SunTrust. Bickerstaff claimed the bank's overdraft fee amounted to usury, and he filed suit on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated. After this complaint was filed, SunTrust notified all of its depositors, including Bickerstaff, that there was a new contract, and this new document would control all future dealings. Bickerstaff was not aware of the new arbitration provision or the window of
time available to reject it when he filed his lawsuit.9
Upon receiving Bickerstaff's complaint, SunTrust immediately filed a
motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied this motion, holding
that Bickerstaff had substantially complied with the new deposit contract's notification requirements by filing his complaint. Bickerstaff then
moved to certify a class of all Georgia citizens with a SunTrust deposit
agreement who had at least one overdraft of under $500 resulting from
an ATM transaction, and who paid an overdraft fee on that transaction
in the last four years. This motion was denied.' 0
Both SunTrust and Bickerstaff appealed the trial court's ruling." SunTrust argued the trial court erred when it declined to compel Bickerstaff
to arbitrate his claim, but the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's holding that Bickerstaff's complaint satisfied the notice requirement. Bickerstaff, on the other hand, appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion for class certification. The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's denial of class certification, holding that Bickerstaff's avoidance of the mandatory arbitration clause applied to him and him alone,
and, because the other potential members of Bickerstaff's class had almost certainly not opted out of the arbitration agreement within the allotted time, Bickerstaff's class would be a class of one. Because such a
result is unallowable under the numerosity requirement of section 9-1123 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.),1 2 the attempt to

9. Id.
10. Id. at 461, 788 S.E.2d at 790.
11. See Bickerstaff v. SunTrust Bank, 332 Ga. App. 121, 124, 128, 770 S.E.2d 903, 907,
909 (2015).
12. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23 (2015 & Supp. 2016). See Part III for more discussion on this
statute and its application in Georgia. In deciding that Bickerstaff's proposed class was
defunct, the court of appeals looked to the numerosity requirement, and held that, because
only Bickerstaff had escaped the arbitration clause, he was the only class member, and thus
the class lacked numerosity. Bickerstaff, 299 Ga. at 462, 788 S.E.2d at 790-91. For a more
detailed analysis of the operation of § 9-11-23, see Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP
v. Ratner, 295 Ga. 524, 762 S.E.2d 419 (2014).
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certify a class failed according to the court of appeals.13 Bickerstaff appealed from the court of appeals judgment, and the Georgia Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 14
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Strength in Numbers: O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23
In the state of Georgia, class actions are governed by O.C.G.A. § 9-1123.15 This code section was based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,16
and its language mimics that of Rule 23 almost without deviation.' 7 This
uniformity means Georgia state courts often analyze federal courts' interpretations of Rule 23 in adjudicating questions regarding O.C.G.A. §
9-11-23.18 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(a) sets out four requirements that must be
satisfied in order for a class action to be appropriate: (1) the parties must
be so numerous that joinder would not be practicable; (2) there must be
questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties must be able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.19 Additionally, O.C.G.A. § 9-1123(b) provides a list of situations where class actions are appropriate vehicles for remedy. 20 First, a class action may be appropriate when separate actions might result in inconsistent judgments, or when these individual judgments might impair or impede the interests of the other
parties. 21 Second, a class action may be appropriate when the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act in a manner generally applicable to the class as a whole, making class-wide judgment proper. 22
Third, a class action may be appropriate when the court finds that the
common questions of law or fact predominate over any individual concerns, and a class action is the best way to provide a remedy when the
situation is viewed in light of the interests of the individual members in
controlling the litigation, the extent of any already ongoing litigation, the

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Bickerstaff, 299 Ga. at 462, 788 S.E.2d at 790-91.
Id. at 461, 788 S.E.2d at 790.
See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
Compare O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23, with FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
Ratner, 295 Ga. at 525, 762 S.E.2d at 421 at n.3.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(a).
See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(b).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(b)(1).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(b)(2).
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desire to keep the litigation in a particular forum, and the difficulties
23
likely to be encountered pertaining to the management of the class.
B. For Whom the Statute Tolls: The Power of Class Representatives to
Toll the Statute of Limitations for the Whole Class in American Pipe
& Construction Co. v. Utah
24
In the landmark case American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, the
Supreme Court of the United States began the trend of granting more
power to the named plaintiff, as the Court held that the named party's
commencement of the class action suspends or "tolls" the running of the
25
statute of limitations for all asserted members of the class.
In 1964, the United States filed civil complaints against American
Pipe & Construction Co. for conspiring to restrict the trade of steel and
concrete piping. After lengthy negotiations, a final judgment was agreed
to on May 24, 1968, and this agreement enjoined the defendant from violating antitrust laws. 26 Almost a year later, on May 13, 1969, the state
of Utah launched a class action against American Pipe & Construction
Co., alleging the company had conspired to rig prices of concrete and
steel. Utah claimed its suit represented various public bodies, including
state and local agencies who had used the pipes provided by the defendant. This suit was found to be within the applicable statute of limitations,
as it was filed less than a year after the original judgment. However, the
defendants moved for an order stating that the plaintiffs could not proceed as a class. The district court judge granted the motion, holding that
the class did not satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23 because
there were not enough state and local entities that could demonstrate
27
injury to justify the class. Eight days later, more than sixty towns, municipalities, and water districts in Utah filed motions under Rule
24(a)(2) 28 to intervene as plaintiffs as of right, or, alternatively, to inter29
vene by permission under Rule 24(b)(2). Each of these parties had been
claimed as members of the original failed class, and the district court denied these motions, holding that the statute of limitations had run, and

23. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(b)(3).

24. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
25. Id. at 554.
26. Before these civil complaints were filed, the defendant plead nolo contendere after
a grand jury indicted it for restricting the trade of steel and concrete piping. See id. at 54041.
27. Id. at 541-43.
28. FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a)(2).

29. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(2); American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 543-44.
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the filing of the class action had not tolled the running of the limitations
period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the denial of intervention as of right, but it reversed the denial of permissive intervention.30 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.3 1
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart first traced the history of
Rule 23, highlighting a number of problems that had existed under the
rule as it stood before its substantial reworking in 1966.32 Specifically,
Justice Stewart drew attention to how, under the older version of the
rule, courts had been divided as to whether parties should be allowed to
join or intervene as members of a class once the statute of limitations had
run, even when the initial class action had begun at a proper time. 33 According to Justice Stewart, that confusion was not present under the updated version of Rule 23, as there were "no conceptual or practical obstacles in the path of holding that the filing of a timely class action complaint
commences the action for all members of the class as subsequently determined." 34 The Court argued this was the case because, unlike under the
previous rule, a class action is not an invitation to joinder, but a legal
vehicle designed to get rid of redundant filings.35 Justice Stewart then
argued this same standard applied to members of the class who did not
know the suit existed, as Rule 23 does not give class members a duty to
take note of the suit or fulfill any responsibilities regarding it until the
existence and limits of the class have been established and notice of membership has been extended. 36
Turning to the facts before the Court in American Pipe, the Court held
that, because the district court only denied class certification due to a
lack of numerosity (as opposed to lack of standing, bad faith, or a frivolous complaint), there was no reason to allow the expiration of the statute
of limitations to keep the plaintiffs from intervening under Rule 24.37
Moreover, the Court held that this in no way encouraged a potential
plaintiff to "sleep on his rights," because a defendant to a class action
must still be notified of the action against him, and such an interpretation of Rule 23 is essential if the efficiency and economy the Rule was

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 543-45.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 545-46.
Id. at 549-50.
Id. at 550.
Id.
Id. at 551-52.
Id. at 552-53.
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intended to create is to survive.38 In Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc.,39 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dealt
with a similar issue, but this time the issue was whether the class representative could satisfy a contractual requirement. 40
C. Rule 23 and ContractualNotice: Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc.
In Kornberg, two plaintiffs, Albert and Laura Kornberg, initiated a
class action against Carnival Cruise Lines after they allegedly suffered
damages from faulty sanitary systems on a cruise ship. The district court
denied class certification because the class was not numerous enough and
the plaintiffs were not typical of the class. This was because the contract
the plaintiffs entered into when they bought the cruise ship tickets contained a provision requiring notice of a claim to be filed within 185 days.
The district court found that not all of the potential class members had
complied with this requirement, and even though the named plaintiffs
had complied with this requirement, the court held that the class was not
numerous enough, as the named plaintiffs complaint and notice did not
serve as notice on behalf of the other potential plaintiffs. After the district
court's denial of class certification, the defendant moved for summary
judgment, and the district court dismissed the plaintiff's suit because of
certain disclaimers in the contract. 41
After dealing with the disclaimer issue, the Eleventh Circuit turned to
the district court's denial of class certification. 42 Writing for the court,
Judge Roney first acknowledged that the court of appeals would only reverse the district court's decision not to allow certification if it had abused
its discretion. 43 Judge Roney stated that under American Pipe, the filing
of a class action commences the suit for the entire class for purposes of
the statute of limitations. 44 Importantly, Judge Roney took this thought
a step further and argued "[t]here is no essential difference between contractual and statutory limitations," and therefore the plaintiffs had satisfied the numerosity requirement. 45 After discussing typicality of the

38. Id. at 553.
39. 741 F.2d 1332 (11th Cir. 1984).
40. Id. at 1333-34.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1335. The court held that the disclaimers relied on by the defendants did not
apply, reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment. Id. at 1336.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1336-37.
45. Id. at 1337.
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class, the court vacated the district court's denial of class certification
and remanded the case for further consideration. 46
D. State Statutory Notice Requirements: Barnes v. City of Atlanta
In the 2006 case, Barnes v. City of Atlanta,47 the Georgia Supreme
Court was tasked with determining whether the named plaintiffs in a
class action could satisfy a written notice requirement dealing with the
exhaustion of administrative remedies on behalf of the whole class. Continuing the trend of granting more power to the named plaintiff, the court
held that named plaintiffs could satisfy statutory notice provisions on behalf of the class as a whole. 48
Barnes arose out of a dispute between a group of attorneys and the
City of Atlanta (the City). In 1999, the attorneys demanded a refund of
occupation taxes, which the city had imposed on them for three years.
Over a year later, those same attorneys became the named plaintiffs in a
class action against the City, and that action sought tax refunds and argued the tax was an unconstitutional regulation of the practice of law.
The trial court granted class certification, but it divided the class into
Class I and Class II. Members of Class I had only asked for the refunds
as part of the class action complaint, but members of Class II had demanded the refunds a year earlier in addition to the more recent class
action.49
After weaving its way through the Georgia court system, 50 the case
reappeared at the trial court on remand. There, the court held that Class
I members-who had not used administrative remedies before joining
Class II members in the class action-must exhaust their administrative
remedies. Nonetheless, Class I was recertified so class counsel could request tax refunds on behalf of Class I members, but Class I could only
recover refunds for the three years before the recertification because, in
the trial court's opinion, the limitations period was not tolled when the

46. Id.
47. 281 Ga. 256, 637 S.E.2d 4 (2006).
48. Id. at 258, 637 S.E.2d at 6.
49. Id. at 256, 637 S.E.2d at 5.
50. See City of Atlanta v. Barnes, 276 Ga. 449, 578 S.E.2d 110 (2003). The trial court
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the constitutional issue, and the supreme
court agreed that the tax ordinance was unconstitutional to the extent that it included lawyers, and a class action for tax refunds was appropriate. See Barnes, 281 Ga. at 256-57, 637
S.E.2d at 5.
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complaint was filed. 51 The court of appeals affirmed, 52 and the supreme
court granted review. 53
Writing for the court, Justice Carley stated that any tax payer whom
the named plaintiffs represent should be thought of as having brought a
suit for a refund at the same time as the named plaintiffs. 54 While the
court acknowledged the existence of statutory provisions detailing ways
for taxpayers to seek refunds, it also made clear that the generally applicable rules pertaining to class actions must also be taken into account,
such as the rule that where "exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
precondition for [the] suit," the named plaintiffs satisfaction of this condition means that each class member will not need to satisfy this requirement individually.55 Thus, when the case went back to the trial court on
remand, the trial court correctly amended its certification order to include the refund claims of the Class I plaintiffs.5 6 Nonetheless, the trial
court erred when it failed to recognize that when Class II filed its refund
claims, it satisfied the exhaustion requirement on behalf of the Class I
plaintiffs.57 Therefore, just as courts allowed the statute of limitations to
be tolled in American Pipe and contractual notice requirements to be
tolled in Kornberg, the Georgia Supreme Court in Barnes allowed named
plaintiffs to satisfy statutory notice provisions on behalf of the class as a
whole, continuing the trend of granting more power to the named plaintiff in a class action. 58
E. Schorr v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
In 2010, the Georgia Supreme Court addressed a similar question in
Schorr v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 9 There, the court held that the
named plaintiff could satisfy a statutory pre-suit written demand requirement on behalf of potential class members.6 0 The controversy in
Schorr arose out of a dispute between homebuyers (the Schorrs, who later

51. Barnes, 281 Ga. at 257, 637 S.E.2d at 5.
52. See Barnes v. City of Atlanta, 275 Ga. App. 385, 620 S.E.2d 846 (2005).
53. Barnes, 281 Ga. at 257, 637 S.E.2d at 5.
54. Id. at 257, 637 S.E.2d at 6.
55. Id. at 257-58, 637 S.E.2d at 6 (quoting ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, 2
NEWBERG ON CLAsS ACTIONS § 5:15, at 438 (4th ed. 2002)).
56. Id. at 260, 637 S.E.2d at 7.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. 287 Ga. 570, 697 S.E.2d 827 (2010).
60. Id. at 573, 697 S.E.2d at 829.
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became the named plaintiffs) and Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (Countrywide). The Schorrs bought a home and financed the purchase through
a security deed which was eventually assigned to Countrywide. The
Schorrs repaid the loan in full, and, pursuant to a Georgia statute then
in effect,61 demanded in writing that Countrywide cancel the security
deed. At the time, that code section stated that if the holder of a security
deed failed to cancel the deed upon written demand, that entity would be
liable to the grantor (in this case, the Schorrs) for $500 in liquidated damages. 62 However, the grantors also had to send a written demand for the

.

$500 in liquidated damages. 63 Countrywide failed to cancel the security
deed, and the named plaintiffs sent a written demand for the $500. Countrywide failed to pay the liquidated damages, and the named plaintiffs
filed a class action in federal court on behalf of Countrywide customers
whose security deeds had not been cancelled properly. Countrywide then
moved to dismiss the claims of putative class members because they argued the complaint failed to allege that they had made written demands
for the liquidated damages. The district court sent a certified question to
the Georgia Supreme Court, asking whether named plaintiffs could satisfy pre-suit written demand requirements for liquidated damages on behalf of the putative class members.6 4
Again writing for the court, Justice Carley began the court's analysis
by pointing to the court's rationale in Barnes, arguing that the holding in
that case (that class representatives could satisfy exhaustion of administrative remedies requirements on behalf of a class) was just one example
of an action a class representative could take.6 5 Justice Carley then cited
a case from the Supreme Court of Massachusetts as persuasive authority
for the idea that "[m]ultiple [pre-suit] demands .

.

. need not be filed on

behalf of all the members of the class."66 Continuing to rely on Barnes,
Justice Carley asserted that there was no difference between the liquidated damages issue in the present case and the administrative remedies
issue in Barnes, as both of these requirements were absolutely essential,
and recovery would have been completely barred but for the satisfaction

61.
2016)).
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
42, 337

O.C.G.A. § 44-14-3 (1999) (current version at O.C.G.A. § 44-14-3 (2002 & Supp.
Id.
Id.
Schorr, 287 Ga. at 571, 697 S.E.2d at 828.
Id.
Id. at 572, 697 S.E.2d at 828 (quoting Baldassari v. Pub. Fin. Trust, 369 Mass. 33,
N.E.2d 701, 707 (1975)).
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of each.67 Despite this importance, the court argued that, just like the
administrative remedies requirement in Barnes, the liquidated damages
requirement in Schorr could be satisfied by the named parties, as the
defendant would still be given sufficient notice of the suit, the cause of
action, and the size of the class.6 8
In each of these cases, there is a noticeable trend towards granting
greater power to the named plaintiff. This trend began with courts giving
the named plaintiffs the ability to control litigation regarding statute of
limitations issues in American Pipe,69 and it continued in Kornberg,70
Barnes,71 and Schorr,72 where courts gave named plaintiffs that same
power in contractual and statutory written notice issues. With this history in mind, the Georgia Supreme Court was poised to expand the
named plaintiffs responsibilities and authority even more in Bickerstaff
v. SunTrust Bank, as it dealt with plaintiffs' attempts to avoid an arbitration clause. 73
IV. COURT's RATIONALE

At its core, the issue in Bickerstaff v. SunTrust Bank was one of notice. 74 While SunTrust grudgingly acknowledged that Bickerstaff avoided
the arbitration clause by filing his lawsuit, it argued the lawsuit could
not proceed as a class action, as the filing of the lawsuit did not reject the
arbitration agreement on behalf of the whole class. 75 The court of appeals
agreed with this argument, and held that Bickerstaff's purported class
was a class of one and therefore lacked numerosity. Writing for the unanimous supreme court, Justice Benham disagreed and held that the filing
of Bickerstaff's complaint tolled the time in which the potential class
members were required to notify SunTrust of their desire to reject the
arbitration agreement.7 6
Justice Benham began his analysis of the case by turning to American
Pipe & ConstructionCo. v. Utah.7 7 In both American Pipe and Bickerstaff,

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 573, 697 S.E.2d at 829.
Id.
414 U.S. at 550.
741 F.2d at 1336.
281 Ga. at 260, 637 S.E.2d at 7.
287 Ga. at 573, 697 S.E.2d at 829.
299 Ga. at 462-63, 788 S.E.2d at 791.
Id. at 459, 788 S.E.2d at 789.
Id.
Id. at 462-63, 788 S.E.2d at 791.
Id. at 462, 788 S.E.2d at 791.
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the classes were initially denied certification due to numerosity, though
the class in American Pipe was eventually allowed to proceed (as the
Court held that the statute of limitations was tolled). 78 Here, the court
recognized that Bickerstaff's proposed class numbered at least 1000 people, and so the only thing that could stop it from meeting the numerosity
requirement of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23 would be Bickerstaff's inability to
evade the arbitration agreement on behalf of the whole class. 79
Next, Justice Benham provided examples of situations where Georgia
courts allowed named plaintiffs to satisfy various conditions and requirements on behalf of the class by citing Schorr, Resource Life Insurance Co.
v. Buckner,80 and Barnes.8 1 Specifically, the court asserted that there was
no reason for the contractual notice requirements placed upon depositors
by SunTrust to be treated differently than the notice requirements placed
on taxpayers in Barnes.82 However, the court conceded that it had never
examined the issue that Bickerstaff presented, as the aforementioned
cases dealt with statutory or contractual notice requirements, while Bickerstaff featured a time-based contractual limitations period. 83 As the case
was one of first impression, Justice Benham looked outside of Georgia to
two federal court cases which had examined similar issues in disputes
between passengers and cruise lines. 84 In those cases, the federal courts
held that since the filing of a class action begins the suit for the entire
class, the same rule can be applied to contractual issues.85 With this authority in mind, the supreme court turned to the issue of whether this
86
rationale might be congruent with Georgia contract law.

78. Id.; American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 543.
79. Bickerstaff, 299 Ga. at 462-63, 788 S.E.2d at 791.
80. 304 Ga. App. 719, 698 S.E.2d 19 (2010). In this case, the court of appeals took part
in the trend towards giving more power to the named plaintiff, as it held that, in a case
involving form insurance contracts that included a written notice requirement for refunds,
the named plaintiff could satisfy such a notice requirement on behalf of a class. Id. at 727,
698 S.E.2d at 28.
81. Bickerstaff, 299 Ga. at 463, 788 S.E.2d at 791.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 463, 788 S.E.2d at 792.
84. Id. at 463-64, 788 S.E.2d at 792 (discussing Freeman v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17455 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1994) and Latman v. Costa Cruise Lines,
N.V., 758 So. 2d 699 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
85. Id. at 464, 788 S.E.2d at 792.
86. Id.
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SunTrust's arbitration clause stated, "[y]ou may reject this arbitration
agreement," and it defined "you" as the "owner of the account."87 SunTrust contended that, because of the plain language of the agreement, an
attorney for the named plaintiff could not simply reject arbitration on
behalf of other people by filing the named plaintiffs complaint.88 The
court of appeals had examined this issue in terms of privity and had concluded that Bickerstaff could not act on behalf of the potential class members because he was not in privity with them.89 The supreme court, however, declined to abide by this "faulty reasoning," and instead viewed the
issue in terms of agency law, as the "entire class action scheme is based
upon the premise that a member of a class may act as a representative of
the other purported class members." 90 Under Georgia contract law, contractual obligations may be performed by an agent. 91 Moreover, the court
rejected SunTrust's contention that Bickerstaff would illegally abridge
other's rights if he were allowed to reject arbitration on their behalf. 92
Rejecting this, the court stated unequivocally that Bickerstaff's complaint only tolled the contractual period only for the purpose of allowing
potential class members to elect to join the class or not, and did not
abridge other's rights. 93
Next, the court turned to the issue of notice, as SunTrust stringently
asserted that each class member must provide the bank with individual
notice of an intent to reject arbitration. 94 The court of appeals had concluded that Bickerstaff would be able to bind class members to a rejection
of the arbitration clause until the class was certified, and the members
could then opt out.9 5 Justice Benham fervently disagreed, contending

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 465, 788 S.E.2d at 792.
90. Id. at 465, 788 S.E.2d at 792-93.
91. Id. at 465, 788 S.E.2d at 793. See also In re Charter Co., 876 F.2d 866, 873 (11th
Cir. 1989) (holding that "the representative in a class action is an agent for the class members.").
92. Bickerstaff, 299 Ga. at 465-66, 788 S.E.2d at 793. SunTrust was specifically concerned with the issue of attorney fees. The arbitration clause granted prevailing parties (at
arbitration) the right to collect attorney fees and costs, and SunTrust asserted that Bickerstaff could keep people from getting these fees if he was allowed to reject the arbitration
agreement on behalf of other people against their will. Id.
93. Id. at 466, 788 S.E.2d at 793.
94. Id. at 466, 788 S.E.2d at 793-94. Specifically, SunTrust would have required each
class member to send the bank their name, address, account name, account number, and
the depositor's signature. Id.
95. Id. at 467, 788 S.E.2d at 794.
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that the court of appeals reasoning demonstrated a "fundamental misconception about the way class actions work," as the entire purpose of
class actions is that all putative class members benefit from the class
representative's filing of the complaint.96 Indeed, Bickerstaff's complaint
only tolled the time in which other people might opt in or out of the class,
and did not bind others to rejection of the clause.97
Finally, the court determined that when potential class members elect
to join the class, they would automatically ratify the filing of the complaint, which would relate back to the timely notice Bickerstaff made
upon filing his complaint.9 8 Justice Benham held that this is a necessary
element of the class action process, and by opting in to Bickerstaff's class,
a new member displays her intent to sue SunTrust and reject the requirement to arbitrate.99 Indeed, "[t]olling and the notion of relation back are
simply two sides of the same coin."100 For these reasons, the court reversed the court of appeals decision, and held that Bickerstaff's class action complaint tolled the contractual limitation for rejecting the arbitration clause on behalf of all putative class members, and therefore, the
numerosity requirement of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23(a)(1) was met. 101
V. IMPLICATIONS

A. By Allowing Plaintiffs to Toll ContractualNotice Requirements, Has
the Georgia Supreme Court Also Tolled the Death Knell for Opt-Out
Provisionsin Georgia?
The Georgia Supreme Court's ruling in Bickerstaff v. SunTrust Bank
could greatly affect both SunTrust and other corporations like it, which
undoubtedly led to SunTrust's unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States on October 6, 2016.102 Perhaps the most obvious consequence of Bickerstaffis that many more lawsuits will be able to proceed
as class actions than was previously the case. Indeed, any time one person is able to escape from a corporation's mandatory arbitration clause,
that entity will be leaving itself open to attack from multiple plaintiffs,
as that one person will be able to buy other people more time to reject the
arbitration agreement themselves. While this certainly is good news for
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 468, 788 S.E.2d at 794.
Id. at 468, 788 S.E.2d at 795.
Id. at 469, 788 S.E.2d at 795.
Id. at 470, 788 S.E.2d at 796.
Id.
Id.
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Bickerstaff, No. 16-459 (Oct. 6, 2016).
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plaintiffs (and their attorneys), it could leave some corporations in dire
straits. Specifically, any entity which gives its customers the chance to
opt out of an arbitration agreement within a given amount of time is now
running the risk of class actions being filed against it, and these actions
could easily include plaintiffs who did not satisfy the notice requirements. As SunTrust pointed out in it its petition for a writ of certiorari
before the Supreme Court of the United States, over 100 million households use a checking account, and more than a quarter of these agreements allow their customers to opt out of arbitration. 103 Therefore, it is
likely that corporations across the state will be taking a hard look at their
own contracts to determine if Bickerstaff leaves them vulnerable. For all
practical reasons, will Bickerstaff signal the demise of opt-out clauses in
Georgia? As SunTrust puts it, "why would any rational company take the
risk of including an opt-out clause?"1 04 While the court's decision in Bickerstaff may have benefited the plaintiffs in that specific case, it is foreseeable that future plaintiffs could be deprived of a way out of these
clauses as an unintended consequence of Bickerstaff. Conversely, could a
future court use Bickerstaffto grant even more power to the named plaintiff, extending the current trend even more?
B. How Can Bickerstaff be Reconciled with AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion?
A more difficult question arises in situations more like Bickerstaffs,
where the only reason he was able to opt out of the arbitration clause was
because the clause was found to be unconscionable. 105 Any discussion of
arbitration unconscionability must be had in light of the Supreme Court's
ruling in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.106 In AT&T, the Court reversed a finding by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that a mandatory arbitration clause used by AT&T was unconscionable on California state law grounds.10 7 Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia found the arbitration clause could not be deemed unconscionable
on state law grounds, because the rule the Ninth Circuit relied on was
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).1 08 This holding severely
circumscribed plaintiffs' abilities to use state law to have arbitration

103. Id. at 37.
104. Id. at 38-39.
105. Bickerstaff, 299 Ga. at 460, 788 S.E.2d at 789.

106. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
107. Id. at 338, 352. The Ninth Circuit specifically relied on Discover Bank v. Superior
Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). AT&T, 563 U.S. at 338.
108. AT&T, 563 U.S. at 352; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012).
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clauses declared unconscionable.109 With regards to Bickerstaffs consequences, if AT&T means the FAA always preempts state law claimsthus making it immensely difficult to declare an arbitration clause unconscionable-Bickerstaff's holding will be limited. In appealing to the
Supreme Court of the United States, SunTrust's main argument was that
the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Bickerstaff is "egregious," because it flies in the face of AT&T.110

The Court's holding in AT&T is by no means airtight, and some courts
have found ways around it by utilizing the "savings clause" of the FAA.111
One example can be seen in In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation
MDL No. 2036,112 where the Eleventh Circuit used the savings clause of
the FAA to hold that generally applicable contract defenses such as
fraud, duress, and unconscionability might still be used to avoid arbitration clauses if the challenge to the clause centers on the way it was
formed, rather than the mere fact that it is an arbitration clause. 11 3 Due
to the murkiness of the Supreme Court's holding in AT&T (made murkier
by Bickerstaff), Georgia businesses have found themselves in a state of
limbo. Should they rewrite their arbitration clauses in such a way as to
make them undeniably conscionable, so as not to incur the sting of the
savings clause of the FAA and watch as one plaintiff turns into a thousand through Bickerstaff? Interestingly, a court could find that a lack of
an opt-out clause makes a contract unconscionable on its face, which
would allow Bickerstaff to open the floodgates no matter what Georgia
businesses do.

109. For a detailed discussion of AT&T (and one of its exceptions), see Jacob Johnson,
Note, Barras v. BB&T: Chartinga ClearPath to Apply Concepcion Through a Quagmire of
Divergent Approaches, 64 MERCER L. REV. 591 (2013) This article argues that, in the aftermath of AT&T, four approaches to the Court's holding have developed: "(1) Concepcion represents a narrow exception that preempts state standards based on the policy that plaintiffs
ought to have incentives to litigate; (2) arbitration provisions can never be grounds for substantive unconscionability unless the provision would inhibit bilateral arbitration; (3) arbitration provisions are never substantively unconscionable, requiring extreme procedural
unconscionability; and (4) all unconscionability of arbitration is preempted." Id. at 598.
110. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 23, Bickerstaff, No. 16-459 (Oct. 6, 2016).
111. 9 U.S.C. § 2. This statute states that arbitration agreements shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id.
112. 685 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012).
113. Id. at 1277.
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VI. CONCLUSION

On December 2, 2016, the Georgia Supreme Court declined to grant
SunTrust a writ of Certiorari.114 This means Bickerstaff v. SunTrust
Bank is now the law in Georgia, and possibly thousands of Georgia businesses will need to put serious thought into how to protect themselves.
Had the case been accepted and reversed, questions about the reach of
AT&TMobility LLC v. Concepcion would remain. It may take some time
for the full ramifications of Bickerstaff to be known, but for now, Georgia
courts across the state may be faced with an influx of class actions, as
businesses contemplate how to protect themselves and move forward.
DAVID CROMER

114. Denial of Petition for Certiorari, Bickerstaff, No. 16-459 (Dec. 2, 2016), 2016 U.S.
LEXIS 7351.

556

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

